Thursday, December 27, 2007

Judges ScrewUps

Government Inc. » Robert O'Harrow Jr.
http://letters.washingtonpost.com/W0RH010B0A98F160917E63449309C0

News About the Government Contracting Sector:

Fences, Sensors and Money (February 01)
Cost Overruns (January 31)
Castles Made of Sand (January 30)
Blackwater and Malpractice (January 27)
Sand, Maintenance and Money (January 25)

Monday, November 26, 2007

Chergosky v Crosstown Bell

U must "pierce the corporate veil" of all contracts of the municipality of St. Paul
also an Unrecorded contract is valid.......

Citing Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Minn. App. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 463 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 1990), Schilling argues that Miller improperly used corporate funds to pay a personal loan with Norwest. In Chergosky, the shareholder did not maintain a separate corporate checking account, but rather placed all corporate funds in his personal checking account, and the facts do not indicate that the personal expenses the shareholder used corporate funds to pay were related to corporate business.In this case, the undisputed evidence shows that Miller agreed to pay $143,043 for corporate debt owed by Emerald Green to Murray and that Miller obtained the Norwest loan to pay for the purchase of Emerald Green. Thus

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS
A06-1993

Richard Colliers,
Relator,

vs.

Dakota County Development Agency,
Respondent.

Filed November 20, 2007

Affirmed

Kalitowski, Judge

Dakota County Community Development Agency

Lisa Hollingsworth, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., 712 Canterbury Road, Shakopee, MN 55379 (for relator)

Mary G. Dobbins, Mary G. Dobbins & Associates, 7400 Metro Boulevard, Suite 100, Edina, MN 55439 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Minge, Judge; and Harten, Judge.* U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KALITOWSKI, Judge

Relator Richard Colliers appeals from the termination of his Section 8 housing benefits, arguing that the record does not support the termination of benefits, the hearing officer’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, and he was not given a reasonable accommodation. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

I.

Relator Richard Colliers argues that the hearing officer’s decision to terminate his Section 8 housing assistance was unsupported by substantial evidence. The Dakota County Community Development Agency must follow federal regulations governing the Section 8 program, but has discretionary authority to terminate assistance to a program participant if a program obligation is violated. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 (2006). A participant’s obligations include providing an accurate and complete report of income and employment, and giving notice prior to moving from an assigned residence. 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)(2), (4), (f) (2006).

When a public housing authority terminates an individual’s Section 8 housing assistance after an informal hearing, it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Carter v. Olmsted County Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 574 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 1998). This court upholds an agency’s quasi-judicial determinations unless they are “unconstitutional, outside the agency’s jurisdiction, procedurally defective, based on an erroneous legal theory, unsupported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary and capricious.” Id. Substantial evidence is: “(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; and (5) evidence considered in its entirety.” CUP Foods, Inc., v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 563 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001).

Here, it is relator’s burden to prove that the CDA’s decision must be reversed because it is unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. Relator argues that no evidence shows that he intentionally or fraudulently failed to report income and an apartment move, and that the hearing officer failed to make that finding. But the Section 8 housing choice voucher program does not mandate that the agency prove fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation before terminating a participant’s housing assistance; the termination decision is within the agency’s discretion. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c). Nor does the program require a finding of intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation to uphold the agency’s termination decision. Id. Moreover, the record indicates that the hearing officer implicitly determined that relator’s failure was intentional, finding that “while Mr. Colliers may have memory difficulties it appears unlikely that this many failures to report information to the CDA could have occurred given his otherwise generally good compliance with the CDA and employment requirements.” This inference that relator’s failure to report was intentional is further buttressed by the evidence offered in support of the agency’s termination decision.

Relator completed five recertification applications from 2002 to 2006. His application in 2002 demonstrates his understanding that he was required to provide information about his employment, because he did so then. In years 2003 to 2006, relator claimed he had no employment, but four companies verified that relator was employed with them during that time period. On each recertification form, relator indicated that he understood his housing assistance could be terminated for misrepresenting his income. The hearing officer specifically cited relator’s failure to report multiple employers over multiple years in her decision to uphold the termination of benefits. She rejected relator’s claim that his memory problems impaired his ability to report income and employment, noting that relator attended mandatory CDA appointments and retained employment with numerous employers despite his memory difficulties. Thus, the evidence supports the conclusion that relator understood he was required to report income and employment, but chose to not do so.

II.

Relator argues that the hearing officer’s decision to terminate his housing assistance was arbitrary and capricious. A decision is arbitrary and capricious if the decision-making body: “(1) relied on factors not intended by the [relevant legal authority]; (2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the issue; (3) offered an explanation that conflicts with the evidence”; or (4) made a decision “so implausible that it could not be explained as a difference in view or the result of the [relevant legal authority’s] expertise.” Rostamkhani v. City of St. Paul, 645 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Minn. App. 2002). A hearing officer’s “conclusions are not arbitrary and capricious so long as a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made has been articulated.” In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Minn. 2001).

Relator asserts that the hearing officer’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because the officer failed to adequately consider evidence that relator’s disability directly impaired his reporting. We disagree. The hearing officer described all of the evidence presented at the hearing, including evidence of relator’s disability and evidence of the memory difficulties relator suffered because of his disability. The hearing officer concluded that the evidence did not show that relator’s memory problems caused his failure to report his income, employment, or a move to a new apartment. Thus, the record indicates that the hearing officer considered whether relator’s head injury caused his failure to report and concluded that it did not. Accordingly, we conclude that the hearing officer’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.

III.

Relator argues that the hearing officer failed to consider his request for a reasonable accommodation. “[T]o prevail on a reasonable accommodations claim, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the accommodation she seeks is reasonable on its face.” Hinneberg v. Big Stone County Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 706 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Minn. 2005). In Hinneberg, the plaintiff sought an exception to the residency requirement for the public housing voucher program. Id. at 223. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Hinneberg had to show three elements: “necessity, equal opportunity, and reasonableness.” Id. at 226. The court found Hinneberg met the necessity requirement by introducing doctors’ opinions supporting her requested accommodation. Id. at 226-27. The court also found that Hinneberg met the second element; that her proposed accommodation was necessary to afford her equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. Id. at 227-28.

Here, the hearing officer properly found that relator never made a request for a reasonable accommodation. But relator argues on appeal that a social worker or case manager should have been required to help him complete the annual certification forms. We disagree. Even if the doctor’s letter that relator submitted at the hearing was a request for accommodation, relator failed to show his proposed accommodation was necessary because he testified that he had assistance filling out the applications. And relator also failed to show that he did not have equal opportunity to continue receiving Section 8 benefits without such assistance. Because relator does not satisfy all necessary elements to show he was entitled to a reasonable accommodation, we conclude the district court’s failure to provide reasonable accommodations did not constitute error.

Affirmed.



* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.


Sunday, September 30, 2007

Judge Margaret Marrinam-Immunity?

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A05-28 Nancy C. Lazaryan,

Appellant,

Evelyn C. Wallace,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Judge Marrinan of the Ramsey County District Court

in her Capacity Personally,

Respondent, Ronald Riach,

Respondent.

Filed September 6, 2005 Affirmed

Parker, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court

File No. C6-04-6622

Nancy C. Lazaryan, 10734 West Lake Road, Rice, MN 56367 (pro se appellant)

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, John S. Garry, Assistant Attorney General, 1100 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2128 (for respondent Judge Marrinan)

Richard J. Thomas, Bryon G. Ascheman, Burke & Thomas, PLLP, 3900 Northwoods Drive, Suite 200, St. Paul, MN 55112 (for respondent Ronald Riach)

Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Parker, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N PARKER, Judge

Appellant Nancy C. Lazaryan raised numerous objections to probate proceedings concerning her father’s estate before respondent Judge Margaret Marrinan. Following several adverse rulings, appellant brought suit against Marrinan personally and the estate’s special administrator, respondent Ronald Riach, alleging, respectively, violation of various constitutional rights and fraud. Respondent now appeals from the district court’s dismissal of that suit for failure to state a claim as to both respondents. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), we consider de novo whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003). We consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving parties. Id.

1. Appellant argues that the district court erred by dismissing her claims against respondent Judge Marrinan as barred by judicial immunity. The applicability of an immunity defense is a question of law. Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn. 1996). Judicial immunity provides that a judge cannot be held liable to anyone in a civil action for “acts done in the exercise of judicial authority.” Linder v. Foster, 209 Minn. 43, 45, 295 N.W. 299, 300 (1940) (quotation omitted).

Appellant’s allegations against respondent Judge Marrinan are exclusively concerned with actions taken in the exercise of the judiciary’s statutory authority to administer the estate. See Minn. Stat. § 524.1-302(a) (2004) (providing a district court hearing a probate matter “has full power to make orders, judgments and decrees and take all other action necessary and proper to administer justice in the matters which come before it”). Those actions are protected by judicial immunity. Appellant’s contention that her challenge to the constitutionality of the doctrine of judicial immunity must be decided by a jury has no legal support and is without merit.

2. Appellant argues that the district court erred by dismissing her claim that Riach made fraudulent statements to the court. The district court concluded that the statements had legal support and that Riach believed them to be true. See Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520, 532 (Minn. 1986) (holding that elements of fraud include a false statement concerning a past or existing material fact susceptible of knowledge and knowledge of the falsity of the statement or uncertainty as to its truth).

Appellant argues that the district court was bound to accept as true, for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, her assertions concerning the joint-tenancy ownership she claims her father and mother exercised over certain disputed testamentary property. The existence of a joint tenancy is a legal question not entitled to a presumption of truth in the context of a motion to dismiss. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2944 (1986) (observing that in considering a motion to dismiss, the court will consider “all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [but is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

As to appellant’s argument alleging that her mother, defendant Wallace, was a victim of Riach’s fraud, we observe that a special term panel of this court denied a motion filed by Lazaryan and Wallace requesting that Wallace be made a party to this matter. The fraud claim concerning Wallace therefore fails for lack of standing. Appellant did not state a fraud claim upon which relief could be granted.

As to the claim that Riach violated appellant’s constitutional rights, because Riach is not a state actor, he is not susceptible to suit for depriving others of their constitutional rights. See Coller v. Guardian Angels Roman Catholic Church of Chaska, 294 N.W.2d 712, 716-17 (Minn. 1980) (holding that claims for constitutional deprivations only extend to state actions). Finally, appellant’s claim that Riach defamed her in his testimony is also without merit. “[P]articipants in judicial and legislative proceedings are entitled to an absolute privilege, a grant of total immunity for false and defamatory statements regardless of the nature or intent of the speaker.” Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Minn. 1982).

Affirmed.* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

Monday, August 13, 2007

Impeachments of Judges

http://nancylazaryan.blogspot.com www.mncourts.gov

MEETING SUMMARY

Committee on Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards

June 8, 2007

Persons Present:

Hon. Paul Anderson Sen. Tom Neuville

Sen. Don Betzold Hon. Gary Pagliacetti

Felicia Boyd Amy Rotenberg

Hon. Tanya Bransford Patrick Sexton

Hon. Edward Cleary Rep. Steve Simon

Annamarie Daley Dane Smith

Hon. Sam Hanson Rep. Steve Smith

Karen Janisch Hon. William Walker

Jeff Johnson Bill Wernz

Jeremy Lane DePaul Willette

Cmdr. Bill Martinez Hon. Bruce Willis

Sharon Mohr

Persons Absent:

Robert M.A. Johnson Virginia Stringer

Hon. Leslie Metzen

Court Services Staff Present:

Kelly Mitchell

I. Next Meetings

The next meetings of the Committee on Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards will be:

Friday, July 20, 2007

10 a.m. to 1 p.m.

Location TBD

Friday, August 10, 2007

10 a.m. to 1 p.m.

Location TBD

II. Meeting Summary

1. Introductions. The Chair, Judge Pagliacetti, welcomed the committee and asked members to introduce themselves.

2. Statement of the Charge. Judge Pagliacetti informed the committee of the charge as stated in the establishing order issued on April 3, 2007: “review and recommend proposed changes to the Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards.” Judge Pagliacetti also explained the difference between the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards. The former govern ethical considerations and behavior that could undermine the impartiality of the judiciary. The latter govern the complaint and disciplinary process for violations of the Code of Conduct. This committee is charged with addressing the Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards. There is currently another active committee reviewing the Code of Judicial Conduct.

3. Historical Overview of the Board on Judicial Standards. Justice Paul Anderson presented an historical overview of the Board on Judicial Standards. Referring to a handout included in the meeting packet, Justice Anderson presented a timeline of judicial disciplinary efforts in Minnesota culminating in the process in place today, referred to charts showing the annual number of judicial and public telephone inquiries, and showed statistical information indicating that complaints as a percentage of case filings have decreased since 1992. Justice Anderson commented on the unique posturing of the Board: the Constitution grants the Legislature authority to provide for the removal, retirement, or discipline of any judge, legislation creates the Board and establishes that the members will be appointed by the Governor and directs the Supreme Court to promulgate rules to implement the statute, and the Supreme Court promulgates rules governing the procedures of the Board. Thus, responsibility for judicial discipline is shared across all three branches of government.

4. Overview of the Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards. Kelly Mitchell presented a summary of the Rules of the Board on Judicial Standards, which included both a short explanation of rule content as well as a walk-through of the chart in the meeting packet detailing the complaint process. Members raised a number of questions about the rules. Some of the points that came out of the discussion were: 1) there is no requirement that the Board meet with a judge who is the subject of a complaint, but it sometimes does; 2) though complaints are confidential until subject to a public hearing, there is nothing to prevent a complainant from taking the issue public; 3) the filing of a complaint against a judge does not create grounds for disqualification in a pending case; for that reason, the judge is not notified of the complaint until the initial evaluation has been completed; the judge will only be made aware that the complaint has been dismissed without action if the judge knew about the complaint; 4) it is unclear in the rules whether Board decisions require a majority of the Board or majority of a quorum; 5) it is unclear what would happen if the Board agreed there should be discipline but could not agree as to what type of discipline should be imposed; 6) the records of the Board have not been destroyed within the records retention timeline provided by the Rules and may be vulnerable to subpoena.

5. Notes and Suggestions from the Office of the Supreme Court Commissioner. Rick Slowes presented information regarding gaps in the Rules relating to mental health revealed in recent cases before the Board and the Supreme Court (e.g., Ginsberg). He stated that the gaps he identified are for the committee’s consideration. Some may be appropriately left to the Court to decide. Some of the gaps discussed were whether interim suspension is appropriate when mental health is at issue, whether the governor’s granting a disability retirement ends the proceedings at the Supreme Court, and whether there are any actions available to the Board for a nonpermanent disability. The full set of issues is included in the handout prepared by Rick Slowes and included in the meeting packet.

6. Suggestions for Change in the Rules from the Board on Judicial Standards. Judge James Dehn, Chair of the Board of Judicial Standards, and David Paull, Executive Secretary of the Board of Judicial Standards addressed the committee. Judge Dehn noted that though there are 2.1 million files initiated in the courts each year, the Board receives very few complaints in comparison. David Paull explained that the committee was formed at the request of the Board. The Ginsberg decision presented a unique situation in which a judge presented mental disability as a defense to charges of personal conduct. That had never happened before, and there were no rules to address it. The Board submitted proposals to the Court to address both mental disability and the private reprimand process.

David Paull addressed the committee with comments regarding the Rules and operations of the Board, which he summed up in five words: access, fairness, protection, independence, and perspective. With regard to access, the Rules make it extremely easy to submit complaints; the Board accepts letters and phone calls, and no particular format or procedure is required. With regard to fairness, the subject of the complaint has several formal opportunities to provide a response, and has the right to a full and formal hearing. With regard to protection, the confidentiality built into the Rules protects judges from invalid complaints, and keeps the majority of complaints out of the media, thereby reducing copycat complaints. With regard to independence, David Paull commented that the independent structure of the Board promotes good decisions. With regard to perspective, he noted that the Rules should be viewed not as a law enforcement mechanism, but as rules of employment. In addition, he noted, it must be remembered that it is not a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct to rule incorrectly. It is the role of the appellate system to correct those errors.

Finally, David Paull closed by suggesting to the committee that a successful approach would incorporate these considerations: 1) whether the proposal preserves public access and sufficient opportunity for the subject of the complaint to respond; 2) whether the proposal preserves the independent atmosphere of the Board; and 3) whether the proposal asks the Board to go beyond its mission to delve into matters that do not concern personal conduct, but rather would require the Board to review procedural or legal determinations.

Several members had comments in response to this presentation. Comments included concern that the confidentiality built into the process makes it difficult to impossible for the Legislature to effectively oversee Board operations, to confirm Board members, and to establish an appropriate budget. Members expressed a desire to see some of the case files of the Board, and asked how the committee can do its work if it is unable to see how the process works. Members also noted that the budgetary structure whereby the Board is required to ask the Legislature for a special appropriation in order to litigate a case interferes with the independence of the Board.

7. Minnesota District Judges Association Recommendations. Judges Charles Porter, Ken Jorgenson, and Marilyn Kaman presented recommended changes to the Rules approved by the Minnesota District Judges Association (MDJA) Board of Directors. Judge Porter explained that the MDJA is an association with two goals: 1) to act as a judges’ union; and 2) to promote judicial education. Judge Porter then presented the MDJA recommendations. He stated that the primary function of the Board should be to provide advice to judges; that is, to advise judges as to the proper course of conduct before they make a mistake. However, that function does not meaningfully exist today because recent cases have negatively affected the comfort level of judges in utilizing that service of the Board.

Judge Porter covered three thematic areas of concern for the MDJA: 1) the integrity of the process that occurs before the Board; 2) confidentiality; and 3) due process and fundamental fairness. With regard to integrity, the MDJA made three recommendations. First, divide the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions of the Board. This will result in one position that is the prosecutor and another that is the staff member of the Board. Second, ensure that the Board is adequately funded so that disciplinary decisions are not made based on whether or not they can be funded. Third, make at least one staff position on the Board a judge. This will engender confidence with the public and ensure the person in the position has the necessary experience to evaluate complaints. With regard to confidentiality, the MDJA’s chief complaint was that, unlike legal disputes that come before the courts, because all proceedings before the Board are confidential, there is no ability to research the Board’s actions, no access to prior decisions, and no basis for a lawyer to give competent advice to a judge as to how to proceed. The MDJA suggested that the identity of the complainant should be disclosed in every case in which the judge is asked to respond, the judge should be entitled to a defense prior to the public hearing stage, and the judge should be entitled to know whether any members of the Board have recused themselves from the decision making process. With regard to due process and fundamental fairness, MDJA’s suggestions included that there should be discovery at the private as well as public stages of the proceedings, the Board should not be able to substitute its findings for that of the fact finding panel, and the issue of whether a majority of the quorum or a majority of the Board is required should be resolved. Judge Porter stated that the concerns about confidentiality and due process and fundamental fairness have had a chilling affect on judges asking for advice. The MDJA suggested that the Board needs to fix its procedures so that it can get back to the purpose for which it was created.

Judge Jorgenson commented that the current rules follow the old model whereby the Board has the ability to substitute its own findings for that of a fact finding panel. The new model places a constitutional judge in the role of the fact finder and sets up the Board as an advocate in the prosecutorial process. He also stated it is important to remember that judges do not have Fifth Amendment privilege and must cooperate in the investigatory process. As such, the judge should have access to the basis for the complaint and the Board should create a better investigatory fact finding process. If a judge asks for a hearing, prior discipline becomes an issue so there should be a rule regarding admissibility of prior discipline. When asked what weight the findings of the fact finder should have, Judge Jorgenson stated “clearly erroneous.” He also stated the MDJA recommends that once a case reaches the public hearing stage, the Board should be an adversary in the action, not a decision maker.

Judge Kaman commented that in making these recommendations, the MDJA attempted to be fair. She noted that the hearing process is imbalanced in that the judge is not given an opportunity to respond to the complaint or engage in discovery until very late in the process.

When asked who should have oversight of the Board, Judge Porter answered that it depends upon the Board’s purpose. If the issue is whether judges are doing a good job for the public, the public should have oversight. If the issue is whether the judges are meeting employment standards, the judiciary should have oversight.

Citizen Comments

. The committee then heard comments from three citizens attending the meeting: Tim Kinley, Elizabeth Sletten, and Nancy Lazaryan. Tim Kinley informed the committee that there are other citizens who are interested in attending meetings who are unable to attend daytime meetings due to their work schedules. He requested that the committee hold at least one meeting in the evening so others will have an opportunity to address the committee. Tim Kinley then commented that the judiciary is one place where blue sky is not happening. He is concerned that the system lacks checks and balances, and he questioned how two opinions from the appellate courts could cite the same rule but have radically different outcomes. He questioned the practice of the Court of Appeals in releasing unpublished opinions. He also stated that the Board on Judicial Standards is like a black hole; complaints go in but no one knows what happens to them. He expressed strong disagreement with the formation of this committee and stated that the meetings should be cancelled and the issue taken up by the Legislature.

Elizabeth Sletten commented that in 2005 she submitted a complaint to the Board consisting of 200 pages (an 8-page cover letter and 192 pages of evidence). She stated her complaint showed the judge was acting improperly in his handling of the case. She asked, if judges are acting outside of the rules and laws and that is not misconduct, what is? She closed by reading a one-page response from the Board stating no action would be taken on her complaint.

Nancy Lazaryan commented that the Constitution gave the power to the Legislature to regulate, discipline, and remove judges; even though Chapter 490 delegates rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court, it is her view that authority cannot be delegated. She stated the Board has failed miserably in serving the citizens of Minnesota. Nancy Lazaryan cited some examples of misconduct, including misconduct that prompted her to file a complaint of impeachment with the Legislature. The Legislature referred the matter to the Board and she received a response stating the complaint had no merit. She stated she has no respect for the Judiciary.

Friday, March 30, 2007

Judicial Watch



March 30, 2007

From the Desk of Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton:

Judicial Watch Sues Congressman Hastings Over Attempted Improper Firing

This week, Judicial Watch filed a lawsuit against Florida Democratic Congressman Alcee Hastings. You may recall that Hastings is one of only six federal judges ever to be removed from office through impeachment. (He was convicted by the Senate on eight articles of impeachment related to a bribery scandal.) Most recently, Hastings was rejected by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi for the chairmanship of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence after Judicial Watch and others complained about his corrupt history.

So, what did Hastings do this time?

The Florida Congressman violated federal law by attempting to improperly terminate the employment of our client, Mark Milosch, and three other employees of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (also known as the Helsinki Commission). After rejecting Hastings for the sensitive intelligence post, Nancy Pelosi threw him a bone and installed him as Helsinki Commission Chairman. Judicial Watch filed a lawsuit on behalf of Mr. Milosch, the Commission’s counsel, seeking a temporary injunction against Hastings to stop the firing from moving forward

Judicial Watch

www.judicialwatch.org

Judicial Watch Sues Congressman Hastings Over Attempted Improper Firing

This week, Judicial Watch filed a lawsuit against Florida Democratic Congressman Alcee Hastings. You may recall that Hastings is one of only six federal judges ever to be removed from office through impeachment. (He was convicted by the Senate on eight articles of impeachment related to a bribery scandal.) Most recently, Hastings was rejected by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi for the chairmanship of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence after Judicial Watch and others complained about his corrupt history.

So, what did Hastings do this time?

The Florida Congressman violated federal law by attempting to improperly terminate the employment of our client, Mark Milosch, and three other employees of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (also known as the Helsinki Commission). After rejecting Hastings for the sensitive intelligence post, Nancy Pelosi threw him a bone and installed him as Helsinki Commission Chairman. Judicial Watch filed a lawsuit on behalf of Mr. Milosch, the Commission’s counsel, seeking a temporary injunction against Hastings to stop the firing from moving forward.

Here’s why this is a shameless example of abuse of power on the part of Hastings, and a clear violation of the law: By law, “[a]ll decisions pertaining to the hiring, firing, and fixing of pay of [Helsinki] Commission staff personnel shall be by a majority vote of the personnel and administration committee…”

After taking over as Chairman, however, Hastings began efforts to terminate employees without properly seeking the approval of his colleagues. Hastings also ignored the strenuous objections raised by Congressmen Christopher Smith and Senator Sam Brownback, both Commission members, who noted Mr. Milosch’s “impressive academic and research credentials” in a February 2, 2007 letter to Hastings. “The firings are illegal and simply cannot stand,” they wrote. Indeed, the general counsel for the Commission issued a legal opinion that any firing/hiring action that does not have the support of the majority of the Commission leadership would be contrary to law.

Why did Hastings target these specific employees? Well, I’ll tell you this. They share one thing in common (aside from their stellar credentials). They are all conservative and pro-life. Hastings is not. The attempted firings appear to be both political and illegal. (Interesting to compare and contrast this story with the U.S. Attorney “scandal.”) Hastings seems to think that the Helsinki Commission is a political plaything rather than an independent agency set up to monitor important international human rights, religious freedom, rule of law (!), and labor rights (!) issues on behalf of the United States.

The bottom line, legally speaking, is this: Congressman Hastings lacks the unilateral authority to fire Mr. Milosch. Judicial Watch asks the court for injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent Mr. Milosch’s termination. A hearing is scheduled for April 16th.

As a result of our lawsuit, I understand that Hastings now says he won’t fire Mr. Milosch unless he gets the necessary 3 out of 4 votes on the personnel and administration committee. Two members (Hastings and Maryland Democratic Rep. Ben Cardin) will vote in favor of termination. Rep. Smith (R-NJ) is a solid vote against termination. Senator Brownback (R-KS), who admirably co-signed a letter against the firings less than two months ago, is thought to now be on the fence. Feel free to call Senator Brownback at (202) 224-6521, or email him here, and let him know what you think about Hasting’s illegal attempt to turn the Helsinki Commission into his personal fiefdom. You can bet he’ll get a lot of pressure from Hastings (and Cardin) to buckle.

Judicial Watch Files Lawsuit Against FDA Regarding Hillary Clinton and “Plan B”

Hillary Clinton’s record of supporting abortion and her disdain for the sanctity of human life is nothing new. And if she is using the powers of her Senate office to force the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to make dubious decisions, we want to hold her to account for it. And so, earlier this week, Judicial Watch filed a new open records lawsuit against the FDA regarding Hillary Clinton’s drive to make the “emergency contraceptive pill,” commonly known as the “morning after pill,” available over-the-counter. We filed the lawsuit, on March 21, after the FDA failed to comply with our August 2006 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking communications between the FDA and Hillary Clinton regarding “.75 levonorgestrel,” which is also known as “Plan B.”

Judicial Watch filed the original FOIA request in August 2006 after Senator Clinton
threatened to block the July 2006 nomination of Dr. Andrew von Eschenbach to head the FDA until the agency made Plan B

Corruption Chronicles – Judicial Watch Blog is the One to Watch

If you haven’t checked out the Judicial Watch blog, Corruption Chronicles, it’s time to stop by and take a look. Corruption Chronicles provides inside information and analysis on government corruption that you won’t read in Chronicles.

U.S. Govt. Can’t Account For 623,292 Fugitives

Although the U.S. government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on a program to assure that deported foreigners who represent a threat actually leave the country, more than 600,000 of them are fugitives whose whereabouts are unknown…

Each month, Corruption Chronicles’ readership grows, and so I encourage you join readers and journalists nationwide who have made Corruption Chronicles a part of their daily routine.

Until next week…

Tom Fitton

President

Monday, March 5, 2007

JUDICIAL RECUSAL PETITION

Thomas J. Maloney
Chicago Greylord Operations - Google Search"Maloney is not, unfortunately, the first American judge to be convicted of taking bribes in murder cases." 2


The Honorable Thomas J. Maloney
From: Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 901 (1997)

“Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through "Operation Greylord," a labyrinthine federal investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago. See United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (CA7 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927 (1996); see generally J. Tuohy & R. Warden, Greylord: Justice, Chicago Style (1989). Maloney served as a judge from 1977 until he retired in 1990, and it appears he has the dubious distinction of being the only Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder case.2 Before he was appointed to the bench, Maloney was a criminal defense attorney with close ties to organized crime who often paid off judges in criminal cases. App. 54-66; 81 F.3d 684, 696 (CA7 1996) (Rovner, J., dissenting) ("[B]y the time Maloney ascended to the bench in 1977, he was well groomed in the art of judicial corruption"). Once a judge, Maloney exploited many of the relationships and connections he had developed while bribing judges to solicit bribes for himself. For example, Lucius Robinson, a bailiff through whom Maloney had bribed judges while in practice, and Robert McGee, one of Maloney's former associates, both served as "bag men," or intermediaries, between Maloney and lawyers looking for a fix. Two such lawyers, Robert J. Cooley and William A. Swano, were key witnesses against Maloney at his trial. Maloney, supra, at 650-652.”

“Maloney was convicted in Federal District Court of conspiracy, racketeering, extortion, and obstructing justice in April 1993. ...”


2 “Although apparently the first in Illinois, Maloney is not, unfortunately, the first American judge to be convicted of taking bribes in murder cases. See, e.g., Ohio v. McGettrick, 40 Ohio App. 3d 25, 531 N. E. 2d 755 (1988); In re Brennan, 65 N. Y. 2d 564, 483 N. E. 2d 484 (1985).”

Quoted from the opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist on behalf of a unanimous court in Bracy v. Gramley, U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 96-6133, decided June 9, 1997. Tulanelink is grateful to Allan Hawkins, J.D., of YouKnowItAll.com for calling attention to this case in his on-line CLE certification course, "Texas Judicial Immunity." A more complete description of the government's case against Judge Thomas Maloney, as published in U.S. v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995), is reprinted here.


Tulanelinks:
Becoming a Judge
The Greylord Affair
Revolting Judges
Buying Judges
Trips for Judges
Gifts and Bribes
Inns of Court
Intimidation of Pro Se's
Secret Prosecutions
Judicial Misconduct
Jailed for Petitioning
Curtailing Petition
The Dream of Justice
Learning the Ropes
Evading Scrutiny
Court Secrecy
Judicial Refugee
Adjunct Faculty Judges
Judge Thomas Maloney
The Finest Judges...
The Litigation Vortex
Without Merit...
The Demise of Justice
Judicial Practices
Secret Courts
Military Style Justice
Crisis of Corruption
Summer School for Judges

Friday, January 5, 2007

Quiet Titles,Fraudulent Conveyances,corrupt courts



Click here: htt RealEstateFiles_ThuneElectionContest 1992_2222 page pdf forensic files, conclusive evidence

Rehnquists Orders via Drugged Delusions

Memorial to Tenants in Common
Bill and Bernice A. Peterson,at 1058 Summit Ave/PO Box 4384 St. Paul, MN.55104-0384

Property at 608 Oak,Ontario formerly the
Chergosky Homestead, Bernice A. Peterson was born, now the Rodney McDonald House for Cancer Children.Minneapolis Minnesota.

US Supreme Court Eminent Domain precedant by Rehnquist ie:
Kelo_58pdf

This BlogginBabe is for Truth,Justice, for Educational Purposes, without Malice of forthought, Humbly submitted to the public .....5Jan2007.

Related Sites: www.sharon-anderson.blogspot.com

www.cpljimanderson.blogspot.com www.blogitbabe.blogspot.com www.sharonanderson.org www.sharon4anderson.org www.alicekrengel.blogspot.com www.billdahn.blogspot.com

When Justices rule on their brain drain All Opinions must be overruled, revisited.

NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON MURDER OR FRAUD.

1058Summit_Tax2007 42 USC 3631 1. MyLegal Domicle Home at 1058 Summit
Anderson + Advocates said URL has been arbitrarily changed?

2. Legal Brief 1988 Rehnquist DENY
legaldomicile1058summitav.msnw

3. Rehnquist on the High Court re:
Re: the Murder by Diabetes of Jane D Duchene in 1986 Petition
4. Eminent Domain Rulings ie: Rehnquist:
EMINENT DOMAIN IN MINNESOTA: Case study Alice Krengel, 823 Allen, WSP
Posted on Fri, Jan. 05, 2007


Rehnquist addiction detailed in FBI files

He took sedative for 10 years, became delusional when doctors took him off drug in hospital

BY ALAN COOPERMAN Washington Post

WASHINGTON — The late Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist took a powerful sedative during his first decade on the high court and grew so dependent on it that he became delusional and tried to escape from a hospital in his pajamas when he stopped taking the drug in 1981, according to newly released FBI files.

The FBI this week released 1,561 pages from its files on Rehnquist in response to Freedom of Information Act requests filed after his death in September 2005.

Privacy laws forbid the disclosure of such files during the person's lifetime.

The fact that Rehnquist checked into George Washington University Hospital for a week in late December 1981 to be treated for back pain and dependence on a prescription drug was previously known. But the files reveal dramatic new details about the length and intensity of the addiction.

During its 1986 investigation, the FBI concluded that Rehnquist began taking the drug Placidyl for insomnia after back surgery in 1971, the year before he joined the court.

By 1981 he apparently was taking 1,500 milligrams each night, three times the usual starting dose for the medication.

Known generically by doctors and others in the medical profession as ethchlorvynol, Placidyl is a sedative and sleep-inducing drug that usually is not prescribed for more than a week at a time.

It is not an opiate and is not a painkiller, but it is addictive, and withdrawal can cause hallucinations and temporary memory loss.

Doctors interviewed by the FBI told agents that when the associate justice stopped taking the drug, he suffered paranoid delusions.

One doctor said Rehnquist thought he heard voices outside his hospital room plotting against him and had "bizarre ideas and outrageous thoughts," including imagining "a CIA plot against him" and "seeming to see the design patterns on the hospital curtains change configuration."

At one point, a doctor told the investigators, Rehnquist went "to the lobby in his pajamas in order to try to escape."

Ultimately, the doctors concluded the withdrawal symptoms were so severe that they began giving the drug to Rehnquist again and then slowly lowered the dosage until he was able to quit taking it entirely on Feb. 7, 1982.

By 1986, the files show, all the doctors interviewed by the FBI said the former drug dependence should not affect Rehnquist's future work on the court, and it did not become an issue in his confirmation as chief justice that year.

ere: St. Paul Pioneer Press 01/05/2007 Rehnquist addiction detailed in FBI files


LEGAL NOTICE: document's are based on SEC filings, current events, interviews, press releases, and knowledge gained as financial journalists, Private Attorney Generals, Candidates for Public Offices, and may contain errors. Investment decisions should not be based solely on these documents Bio for Sharon Anderson , expressly forbids its writers from having financial interests in securities they recommend to readers, affiliated entities, employees, and agents an initial trade recommendation published on the Internet, after a direct mail publication is sent, before acting on that recommendation. TAKING DL_AOL Journal Candidate profile
Senior QueenCandidate2007 Legal Eagle SharonAnderson 1 Journalism Ethics Blogger: Dashboard SharonScarrellaAnderson
1986 Petition Jane Duchene MN Bull SharonScarrellaAndersonUSBriefs - Buzznet Photo Sharing Community Sharon'sFedCases1973to2006_13pdf Anderson + Advocates http://www.sharonanderson.org/ http://www.sharon4anderson.org/

Sharon Anderson

Sharon Anderson
www.seniorqueen.blogspot.com